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EXEcUTIVE IMMUNITY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
By

WILLIAM

G.

HORLBECK,* LORING

E. HARKNESS IH**

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents' the
United States Supreme Court recently recognized that private
citizens have an implied right of action in tort against federal law
enforcement officers who violate their constitutional rights. Specifically, the Court held that the plaintiff Bivens had stated a
cause of action under the fourth amendment against federal narcotics agents who had unlawfully entered and searched his home
and thereafter had subjected him and his family to great fear and
indignity. Quite clearly, the defendants had committed no mere
common law tort, such as false arrest or false imprisonment, but
one of a nascent variety which shall become known as the constitutional tort. Following the Supreme Court's lead in Bivens, federal courts may soon be entertaining actions for damages against
federal officers based not only on the fourth amendment but potentially on any provision of the Constitution which confers a
right upon private citizens. In short, the decision in Bivens has
apparently created a private right of action against federal officials which is analogous to the right of action authorized against
state officials by section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.2 A right
so structured is appealing for both its symmetry and fairness.
*Associate, Law, Nagel, and Clark, P.C., Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1969, University
of Colorado; J.D., 1973, University of Colorado Law School.
**Associate, Rovira, DeMuth & Eiberger, Denver, Colorado; A.B., 1970, Bowdoin
College; J.D., 1973, University of Colorado Law School.
1403 U.S. 388 (1971).
242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 1983], which reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Pursuant to this language, actions for damages have been allowed for deprivation of
many and varied constitutional rights. See Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir.
1970) (freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures); Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105
(7th Cir. 1969) (right to reasonable access to the courts); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp.
797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971) (freedom of
speech); Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (right to due process of
law in suspension proceedings in a public school); Donovan v. Mobley, 291 F. Supp. 930
(C.D. Cal. 1968), modified sub nom. Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970)
(freedom of speech); Robeson v. Fanelli, 94 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (freedom of
assembly).
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There exists no discernible reason to afford an injured citizen a
right of action against state and local officers who violate his
federal constitutional rights while denying him a comparable
right to proceed against federal officers for the same types of
transgressions.
There still remains, however, the inevitable reckoning with
the common law doctrine of official immunity, which has often
served to shelter public officials from the consequences of their
civil wrongs. In recognizing Bivens' cause of action, the Supreme
Court was not obliged to determine the applicability of the defendants' immunity defense. Rather, that question was left to be
decided by the court of appeals on remand. Subsequently, in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents3 the Second Circuit observed the analogy of the constitutional tort action to the statutory action maintainable under section 1983 and adopted the
view of official immunity it had taken in those cases. The case of
Jobson v. Henne4 aptly illustrates the disposition of that court to
apply the doctrine of official immunity "sparingly in suits
brought under 1983." Thus, in Bivens the Second Circuit concluded that the narcotics agents who had violated the plaintiff's
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures were not entitled to immunity for their acts.' This holding was critical to the plaintiff, as a contrary result would have
rendered his newly recognized cause of action worthless. Despite
the result, however, the Second Circuit's opinion in Bivens reflects a need to reexamine the justification for and operation of
the doctrine of official immunity as applied to executive officers
F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
4355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
1Id. at 134.
In suits brought under [section 1983], police officers enjoy no immunity
... . the Civil Rights Act does not, however, apply to federal officers
3456

In its decision in this case, the Supreme Court recognized a right of
action against federal officers that is roughly analogous to the right of action
against state officers that was provided when Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act. It would, we think, be incongruous and confusing, to say the
least, if we should rule that under one phase of federal law a police officer
had immunity and that under another phase of federal law he had no immunity.
Accordingly, we hold that the Agents in this case are not immune from
damage suits based upon allegations of violations of constitutional right.
456 F.2d at 1346-47.
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and to consider the role that executive immunity should play in
constitutional tort cases. It is the purpose of this article to respond to that need.
I.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY

Where the doctrine of official immunity applies, it absolves
government officers of civil liability in tort for official acts or
omissions which result in injury or damage to private citizens.
The most frequently cited justification for such a doctrine is to
encourage fearless public service.7 Legislative immunity, for example, is necessary to encourage the zeal and candor which typify
legislative advocacy at its best.' Likewise, judicial and quasijudicial immunity are essential to enable officers of the courts to
maintain the independence so critical to the exercise of their
judgment and discretion. Finally, the immunity sometimes
granted to executive officers is necessary to remove the threat of
civil liability for official acts in order that men of ordinary prudence will not hesitate to accept government service as a career nor
thereafter to perform their official duties fearlessly in the public
interest.' 0
A second justification for the doctrine of official immunity is
to limit the use of the tort action as a form of review to cases
where review of the official act is permissible under the separation
of powers doctrine." When judicial review of an official act serves
only to police the methods employed to achieve the result as
determined, without touching upon the propriety of the determination itself, no separation of powers problem arises, and review
is proper. In such a case there is no need for the doctrine of
immunity as a device to avoid judicial review. However, where
the legislature delegates to a specific agency or official the power
to make a rule of law determining the legal rights and obligations
of a private citizen, then de novo judicial review of the exercise
'See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, which
provides in part that "any speech or debate in either house shall not be questioned in any
other place."
'See note 7 supra.
'See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335
(1871); Kelly v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1965); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.
1926), aff'd mem., 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
"See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959);
Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 86 (1845);
Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
"See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 5.03 (1958).
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of that power results in a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine insofar as such review permits the judgment of the court
to be substituted for that of the agency or executive authorized
to make that judgment. 2 In such a case official immunity precludes review.
II. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
The traditional test employed by federal courts in deciding
whether official immunity is available to a federal executive officer,' 3 in a suit charging him with tortious conduct in the performance of his duties, is ostensibly a simple one. It requires (1) that
the tortious act or omission be done within the legally prescribed
scope of the officer's authority, and (2) that the act or omission
be discretionary in nature. 4 The court of appeals in Bivens
adopted this traditional standard, holding that the acts of the
narcotics agents were not discretionary acts to which immunity
should attach. 5 This holding, however, did not conclude the issue
of liability. The court went on to hold that even when immunity
is not granted, good faith and a reasonable belief in the validity
of the conduct and in the necessity of the manner of its performance are a complete defense.' This is a questionable approach,
since the recent trend of the courts has been to deny absolute
immunity to executive officers. 7 If, as a matter of law, an officer's
immunity is predictably only qualified at best," it would seem
12d.
"This article focuses on the application of the doctrine of immunity to executive
officials and does not attempt to discuss its potential application to legislators and judges.
'4See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir.
1964); Hughes v. Johnson, 305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579
(2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). For a discussion of the test, see also
Comment, Bivens v. Six Unkown Agents: A New Direction in Federal Police Immunity,
24 HASTINGS L.J. 987 (1973).
"5456 F.2d at 1343-47.
'Id. at 1348.
"See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhoades, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974), where specifically with respect
to the Governor of Ohio, the President of Kent State University, the Adjutant General of
the Ohio National Guard, and various lesser officials, the Supreme Court held that "in
varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of
Government .....
Id. at 1692 (emphasis added). Scheuer was brought pursuant to
section 1983.
"Id. As a consequence of the Court's conclusion that the named officials did not enjoy
an absolute immunity, it reversed the lower court holdings, which had dismissed the
complaints without the filing of an answer on the ground that a claim of executive immunity was an effective plea in bar. At least as to state officials in a section 1983 action,
therefore, it is apparent that executive immunity is properly raised only as an affirmative
defense. This is appropriate since the scope of authority and discretionary function standards each present questions of fact which cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss.
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illogical and counterproductive to allow the officer's subjective
intent to absolve him from liability. For this and other sound
reasons, it is suggested that good faith, subject to the requirements of pleadings and proof, be incorporated as a third element
of a defense of executive immunity rather than be regarded as an
independent defense in itself.
Scope of Authority
The concept of scope of authority plays what may be considered a dual role in determining whether a government officer is
to be held liable in tort; it determines the outer limits of both
liability and immunity.
First, that the official was acting within the scope of his
authority is a prerequisite to liability whenever the cause of action asserted is founded on a deprivation of constitutional rights.
This is so whether the cause of action is an implied right under
the Federal Constitution, as in Bivens, or an express right conferred by a federal statute, as in the section 1983 cases. The
underlying notion is that a deprivation of constitutional rights is
a tort cognizable by the Constitution or its implementing statutes
only if it was committed by an officer of government. In order to
be acting as such, and not as a mere citizen, the tort-feasor must
necessarily have been acting within the scope of the authority
delegated to him by the government. 9
Second, that the official was acting within the scope of his
authority is also a condition to be satisified before a government
official may be granted immunity for his tortious acts. The reasons supporting this requirement are clear enough. Immunity for
government officials, whether granted for the purpose of encouraging fearless public leadership 0 or for the purpose of enforcing
the separation of powers doctrine," can only be justified if the
activity occasioning the injury complained of is a governmental
and not a private one.
The Supreme Court decision in Bivens accents the need to
reconcile these two roles. The threshold question is whether the
scope of authority prerequisite to official immunity is to be coexA.

"This analysis is not to be confused with the requirement that an official be acting
within the scope of his authority in order to establish the liability of the government under
the doctrine of respondeatsuperior insofar as recognized by the Federal Tort Claims Act.
"See notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
"See notes 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
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tensive with the scope of authority prerequisite to official liability. Assuming that both symmetry and fairness require that it
should be so, the only remaining task is to define the extent to
which a constitutional tort-feasor will be deemed to be acting as
an officer of government rather than as a mere private citizen.
1. Scope of Authority in Determining Liability
The definition of the scope of authority has, of course, been
considered by federal courts in the past. For purposes of official
liability, however, it has been significant only in cases arising
under section 1983. The scope of authority concept is there embodied in the "under color of law" language. The meaning of this
language was explained in Monroe v. Pape.2 The defendants,
Chicago police officers, allegedly entered and searched the plaintiff's home without a warrant and unlawfully arrested and detained the plaintiff, depriving him in violation of section 1983 of
his rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.
It was urged by the defendants that the complaint stated no cause
of action under section 1983 on the grounds that
"under color of' enumerated state authority excludes acts of an
official or policeman who can show no authority under state law,
state custom, or state usage to do what he did. 3

The Court, however, explicitly rejected this contention. Adopting
the same construction of the phrase " 'under color of' state law"
for purposes of section 1983 as that announced for purposes of its
criminal counterpart 4 in United States v. Classic,5 the Court
approvingly quoted a portion of Mr. Justice Stone's majority
opinion:
Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law, is action taken "under color of" state law. 2'

All acts made possible solely by reason of the badges of governmental office are included in this phrase. Any other construction
of the statutory language would have been productive of the most
manifest injustice. The defendants, having done their misdeeds
under the cloak of their ostensible authority as officers of govern22365

U.S. 167 (1961).

21d. at 172.

2418 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).

25313
2

U.S. 299 (1941).
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961), quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.

1Monroe

299, 326 (1941). See also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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ment, would then have been permitted to assert that their acts
had been so outrageous as to be beyond the scope of their duties
and thus would have escaped liability under the statute
altogether.
It was to be expected, then, that the Supreme Court would
refuse to sanction such a narrow view of scope of authority when
it recognized the constitutional tort in Bivens. Rather, it adopted
the precise view taken in the section 1983 cases:
[Plower, once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when
it is wrongfully used. An agent acting-albeit unconstitutionally-in the name of the United States possesses a far greater
capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own ...
A private citizen, asserting no authority other than his own, will
not normally be liable in trespass if he demands, and is granted,
admission to another's house. But one who demands admission
under a claim of federal authority stands in a far different position.Y

Indeed, to have done otherwise would have been to ordain that a
breach of a constitutional guarantee or a violation of a criminal
statute could never be the basis for the liability in tort of an
official qua official, even in the absence of immunity-the precise
negation of the theory on which the constitutional tort is founded.
Nor could the official be held liable as a private individual, for
an action will not lie against a private individual for a fourth
amendment tort. That amendment was designed to protect individual rights from governmental, not private, infringement."8
2. Scope of Authority in Determining Immunity
The decisional law attempting to define scope of authority
for purposes of determining official immunity has, by contrast,
evolved largely in the context of common law torts. The prevailing scope of authority test was aptly stated in the leading case of
Barr v. Matteo, 5 a libel action against the Acting Director of the
27403 U.S. at 382, 394 (citations omitted).
2
"Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). See also Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v.
City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
As a result, only a common law action such as trespass would then be available as a
means of redressing the breach of a constitutional guarantee, and often that remedy is
wholly inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for his injury. State courts in which a
trespass action would have to be brought have been notoriously reluctant to award com-

pensation for impairment of the kinds of interests the fourth amendment seeks to protect.
See W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS § 11 (4th ed. 1971).
29360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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Office of Rent Stabilization by certain former employees of that
Agency. The issue raised was whether the defendant was entitled to unqualified immunity by virtue of his position as the
head of a Federal Agency. The Court held that the allegedly
libelous statement "was an appropriate exercise of the discretion
which an officer of that rank must possess ..
."30 Although the
question was close, the Court found that the action of the Acting
Director "was within the outer perimeter of [his] line of duty"3 '
thus rendering his actions privileged.
Thereafter, this "outer perimeter" test was narrowly construed by the Ninth Circuit in Hughes v. Johnson.2 In that case
the court examined and upheld the duty of the defendants as
game wardens to inspect the plaintiffs' premises under the authority of a federal statute.3 3 However, the court found that
"search without warrant and unsupported by arrest, in violation
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ' 34
could not be said to be within the scope of the official duties of
the defendants. Thus, the court would not grant the officials the
benefit of the immunity defense.
The more typical approach to the scope of authority test is
that adopted in Norton v. McShane,31 which permitted even outrageous conduct to be considered within the "outer perimeter" of
the official's scope of authority. In Norton, it was alleged that
various Justice Department officials had unlawfully and maliciously arrested the plaintiffs without probable cause and had
subjected them "to all manner of vile abuse and mistreatment. '36
Damages were sought for false imprisonment, assault, battery,
and a deprivation of equal protection. In attempting to delineate
more precisely the "outer perimeter" of an official's line of duty,
the court adopted some of the broad language of its earlier decision in Spalding v. Vilas:37
The requirements that the act be within the outer perimeter of the
line of duty is no doubt another way of stating that the act must
have more or less connection with the general matters committed by
"Id. at 575.
"4Id.

F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962).
"'18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1970).
"1305 F.2d at 70.
-332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964).
"Id. at 857.
3161 U.S. 483 (1896).
32305
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law to the officer's control or supervision, and not be manifestly or
palpably beyond his authority.1

This view has enabled federal courts to expand the boundaries of an official's scope of authority so that even where his conduct is obviously unconstitutional, it can be made to fall within
the outer perimeter of his duties, thereby satisfying the first prerequisite to assertion of the immunity rule as announced in Barr.
That, in fact, was the result in Norton. In holding that the defendant officials were acting "more or less [in] connection with the
general matters committed by law to their control,"39 the Fifth
Circuit suggested that as long as the ultimate result of their acts
was permissible, any means to achieve that result were within
their scope of authority and therefore potentially deserving of
immunity. On the scope of authority question alone, this was also
the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Bivens:
[W]hat these Narcotics Agents are charged with, despite the allegations of illegality because of lack of a warrant and probable cause,
and the use of unnecessary force, is precisely what Narcotics Agents
are supposed to do, namely, make arrests in narcotics cases. So we
hold they were alleged to be acting "within the outer perimeter of
[their] line of duty.""0

Liability was found in Bivens only because the defendants failed
in their entitlement to immunity on other grounds."
Unfortunately, cases arising under section 1983 disclose little
in the way of discernible trends regarding the contours of scope
of authority as a condition to official immunity. This is true even
where the courts have devoted much energy to defining scope of
authority as it relates to statutory liability. The courts seem to
have been compelled, and not unreasonably so, to adopt the same
standards regarding scope of authority in both contexts, notwithstanding their conspicuous desire to grant official immunity
"sparingly" in order to limit the instances in which the defense
will bar recovery.4"
Given the necessity for espousing a scope of authority test for
purposes of constitutional tort liability which is analogous to that
adopted by the courts in section 1983 cases, and given the breadth
of the scope of authority test as it relates to immunity under the
3332 F.2d at 858-59.
39

Id. at 862.

F.2d at 1343.
"See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
"Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
4456
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prevailing common law decisions, there is good reason for adopting the expansive concept of scope of authority for purposes of
both liability and immunity in the constitutional tort setting.
Perhaps this test is best formulated in the language of the law of
agency: If the act or omission of the defendant official which
results in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights is
committed under the cloak or color of the authority apparently
vested in the defendant by the government, then the act or omission is both cognizable as a constitutional tort and, if the discretionary function requirement is satisfied,4 3 the act is also privileged under the doctrine of official immunity. In articulating the
test, then, the reference is to agency power rather than to agency
authority.
This approach admittedly gives with one hand and takes
with the other. It prevents an escape from liability on the premise
that the constitutional tort theory is inapplicable;" at the same
time, it admits of the potential for immunity with regard to any
actionable conduct.45 However, absent limitations on the types of
official conduct to which immunity attaches, the very act which
creates a cause of action in constitutional tort would also preclude
recovery. Thus, there is a compelling need to impose such limitations by manipulation of the second prerequisite to immunity,
the discretionary function.
B.

DiscretionaryFunction
As previously indicated, the discretionary function requirement is perhaps the most critical in limiting the immunity doctrine to those cases actually warranting its application. It is therefore surprising to observe that what constitutes a discretionary
function is by no means settled.
The normal and familiar meaning of the word "discretion"
is both imprecise and deceptive in the present context. A discretionary act is not simply one which entails the exercise of judgment." Were it so, few human acts could fail to satisfy the test
of discretion. What constitutes a discretionary act, and what dis' 3See notes 46-63 and accompanying text infra.
"See notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra.
"See notes 46-63 and accompanying text infra.
"In determining whether a particular government function falls within the scope of
official immunity, it does not suffice to consider simply whether the officer has "discretion" in the sense that he exercises judgment in choosing among alternative courses of
action. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub
nor. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
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tinguishes a discretionary act from a ministerial one are questions
which defy such simplistic analysis.
Unfortunately, the leading cases on federal executive immunity shed little light on the matter. In Barr v. Matteo,47 for
example, the Court assumed more than it revealed about how to
identify a discretionary function for purposes of executive immunity. Apparently the Court felt that because the defendant,
the Acting Director of Rent Stabilization, was given great latitude in choosing the means of discharging the duties of his office,
he was consequently engaged in the performance of a discretionary function." The Court therefore concluded that any act done
in the exercise of such a function is a discretionary one, deserving
the protection of official immunity.49 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court weighed two very broad policy objectives: the need to
protect the individual citizen from oppressive or malicious governmental action and the exigency of protecting "the public interest . . . . [from] the harassment and inevitable hazards of
vindictive . . . damage suits" against public officials.5" On finding the scales tipped in favor of the latter, the Court found it
necessary to grant unqualified immunity based on the status of
the official, rather than merely to grant a limited privilege based
on the character of his allegedly tortious act. Such a rule is both
arbitrary and unjustifiable. Furthermore, it fails to promote in
any consistent and discriminating fashion the policies underlying
the doctrine of executive immunity.5' Instead of making the official's position dispositive, the courts must shift the focus of inquiry to the act which occasioned the injury. This latter and
better approach has been adopted by the federal courts in section
1983 suits against state and local officials and has been instrumental in facilitating proper application of the doctrine."
'7360 U.S. 564 (1959).
"Id. at 574-75.
"Id. at 575.
SId. at 565.
5
See notes 7-12 and accompanying text supra.
"See Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965), where the court recognized that "the key to the immunity [afforded to a county prosecuting attorney] is that
the acts, alleged to have been wrongful, were committed by the officer in the performance
of an integral part of the judicial process." See also Donavan v. Reinhold, 433 F.2d 738
(9th Cir. 1965); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955); Balistrieri v. Warren,
314 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Wis. 1970). Cf. Corsican Prod. v. Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.
1964). With these cases compare, e.g., Scherer v. Morrow, 401 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969); Skolnich v. Campbell, 398 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1968);
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1. The Lawmaking Test
In contrast to Barr and its predecessors, 3 a line of cases
beginning with Dalehite v. United States,5 4 in which the
"discretionary-ministerial" language of the Federal Tort Claims
Acts was construed, represents a productive attempt to give content to this elusive distinction. In Dalehite the Supreme Court
held discretionary acts to mean those done at a "planning rather
than operational level."" Otherwise stated, the act is a discretionary one if done in the authorship and determination of policy;
the act is a ministerial one if done in the execution of predetermined judgments. 57 While this formulation of the discretionary
function requirement begins to focus on the kind of act deserving
of the protection afforded by official immunity, it does not yet
isolate such acts and exclude all others. For example, the supervisor of a police academy who negligently plans and supervises a
riot control training program acts at the planning level; yet there
appears to be little justification for not holding him accountable
for his failure to train police in the proper use of tear gas or other
weapons. On the other hand, the police officer who makes an
arrest without a warrant based on probable cause acts at the
operational level; yet his act is of such a nature as to warrant the
application of the immunity doctrine.
A better approach to defining the discretionary function was
suggested by Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in
Dalehite:
When an official exerts governmental authority in a manner which
legally binds one or many, he is acting in a way in which no private
person could. Such activities do and are designed to affect, often
deleteriously, the affairs of individuals, but courts have long recognized the public policy that such official shall be controlled solely
Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967); S & S
Logging Co. v. Barker, 366 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1966); Houtenville v. Dunahoo, 286 F. Supp.
5 (N.D. Miss. 1968); Mullins v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 275 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Va. 1967)
(where immunity was granted on the basis of the officer's status).
53
Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896);
Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir.
1964); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
-346 U.S. 15 (1953).
5528 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674, 2680 (1970).

58346 U.S. at 42.
5
"Discretionary" acts are those which require personal judgment, deliberation, and
decision in carrying out the duties the job requires, while "ministerial" acts require only
an obedience to orders, leaving the official with no choice as to how to perform. See W.
PROSSER supra note 28, at 132.
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by the statutory or administrative mandate and not by the added
threat of private damage suits."

According to Jackson's view, a discretionary act can be identified
by determining whether or not the official act creates a rule of law
which is designed to operate upon private persons without their
consent and to determine their legal rights and obligations.
The power to make a rule of law, whether a legislative rule
affecting the many, or a judicial rule affecting the few, has always
been protected in the hands of those authorized to wield such
power.59 Hence, immunity has been granted to legislators, judges,
prosecutors, and jurymen for acts done in pursuit of their official
duties. What the Jackson test recognized is that executive officers
frequently act in legislative and judicial capacities. Applying the
immunity doctrine to executive officers poses some special difficulties. Legislative and judicial immunity have traditionally been
considered absolute. Once the status of legislator or judge attached, immunity for all acts performed within that officer's
scope of authority irrevocably followed.6 0 However, given the
range and variety of duties commonly performed by members of
the executive branch, it cannot be said that executive immunity
should afford such extensive protection. Executives should enjoy
the same immunity as legislators and judges, but only to the
extent that their acts are of a legislative or judicial character.
Hence the need arises to look beyond the status of the official to
the nature of the act performed.
Professor Borchard recognizes this need in considering the
separation of powers justification. He maintains that the classification of discretionary acts "has justification only to the extent
that deliberation and action as to policy constitutes legislation
• . .upon which it would therefore be inappropriate to predicate
tort liability."'"
2. Uniform Rules for High and Low-Ranking Officials
Identification of discretionary functions by resort to the process suggested here not only accords with the policies underlying
"1346 U.S. at 59.

"See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra.
"E.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (legislators); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967) (judges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators); Bradley

v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) (judges).
"Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129, 135 (1925).
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the doctrine of official immunity, but it also applies the same
criteria to Cabinet officers and police patrolmen alike. Heretofore
the law has never recognized, for example, that a policeman could
exercise a discretionary function so as to be entitled to immunity
for his acts.2 But if Jackson's test is adopted, it follows logically
that any time a police officer determines that he has probable
cause to arrest or to search without a warrant, then he has exerted
his governmental authority in such a way as to adjudicate private
legal rights. Even when a warrantless arrest is challenged on the
grounds that probable cause was not present, "it is the function
of the court to determine whether the facts available to the officers at the moment of the arrest would 'warrant a man of reasona6' 3
ble caution in the belief' that an offense had been committed.
One explanation for the historical disparity between the
treatment of police officers and the treatment of higher ranking
officials may be that the common law allowed police officers sued
for false arrest or imprisonment to plead in lieu of official immunity the defense of good faith and probable cause.64 When the
Second Circuit held that the defendants in Bivens were not entitled to immunity for their acts, it simultaneously recognized this
common law defense of good faith and probable cause 5 and remanded the case to the district court for findings of fact on this
issue. It would seem, though, that the discretionary function test
proposed above subsumes the notion of probable cause in a fourth
amendment case,"8 and that there would, therefore, be no need to
pursue the matter further. The finding of no probable cause as a
matter of law would not only compel the conclusion that the
"See Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev 'd on othergrounds sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
3
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 95 (1964).
'See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
"Thus the officer must allege and prove not only that he believed, in
good faith, that his conduct was lawful, but also that his belief was reasonable. And so we hold that it is a defense to allege and prove good faith and
reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest and search and in the necessity
for carrying out the arrest and search in the way the arrest was made and
the search was conducted. We think as a matter of constitutional law and
as a matter of common sense, a law enforcement officer is entitled to this
protection.
456 F.2d at 1348.
"Likewise, for example, where a police officer disperses a crowd assembled to petition
the government for redress of grievances, he would have to show that he believed that
there existed a "clear and present danger" to the community in order to be entitled to
immunity for his act. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

EXECUTIVE TORT IMMUNITY

defendant had been engaged in a ministerial act, but it would
render futile any attempt to raise the common law defense. However, such a rigid rule would not be fair, nor would it promote the
policies underlying immunity. Reversing a policeman's determination of probable cause is no different in the abstract than reversing a judge who issues a warrant on similar facts. There must
be a means of distinguishing honest errors of judgment from
abuses of authority.
Good Faith
Requiring the policeman or other executive officer to have
acted in good faith and without malice provides the means
sought. The effect of this requirement would be to permit inquiry
into the subjective motivations of the officer. The permissibility
of such an inquiry in the immunity context has historically varied
with the status of the officer. Legislators and judges have always
been immune for acts motivated by malice so long as they had
not acted "clearly beyond their jurisdiction." 7 So, too, with highranking federal executives. 8 However, the motives of low-ranking
executives" have always been subject to scrutiny in common law
actions against them for false arrest and imprisonment." Even if
this regrettable disparity were to persist in the application of the
immunity doctrine to constitutional tort claims, it would not
work great injustice because most constitutional torts will be
committed by low-ranking executives whose motives will be open
to examination. Ideally, however, good faith should be a third
prerequisite to immunity for all executives of whatever rank.
There is no good reason why the Acting Director of Rent Stabilization in Barr v. Matteo, like the police officers in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, should not be required to
C.

7

1 Tenney

v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335 (1871) (judges). Cf. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd
sub nom. O'Shea v. Littleton, 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974) (judges).
" Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
"Although the Second Circuit's holding in Bivens as restricted to its facts makes the
defense of good faith and probable cause available only to federal law enforcement officers,
there is no reason why it should not be extended to apply to all operational-level officials
who cause injury to private citizens. By making this defense available to all government
officers, the courts can satisfy their legitimate desire to protect ministerial executives from
personal liability where their individual conduct has been above reproach and at the same
time impose such liability where warranted.
'"See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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demonstrate his good faith before claiming official privilege. 7'
Surely the public cannot wish its government to be so fearless
that it dares by its agents to violate the constitutional rights of
its citizens in bad faith without fear of reprisal. Surely, too, the
judiciary will not be loath, on separation of powers grounds, to
require that executive officers charged with a lawmaking function
discharge that function in good faith and without malice.
7

'But see Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), where the court held

that:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal
motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for
the injuries he may so cause; and if it were possible in practice to confine
such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstruous to deny recovery. The
justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim
is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials,
the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties . . . The answer must be found in a balance between the evils . . ..
In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed
the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do
their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.

